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QUASI-BERKELEYAN IDEALISM AS 
PERSPICUOUS THEISM 
Nicholas Everitt 
In this paper, I argue that the kind of idealism defended by Berkeley is a 
natural and almost unavoidable expression of his theism. Two main argu-
ments are deployed, both starting from a theistic premise and having an 
idealist conclusion. The first likens the dependence of the physical world on 
the will of God to the dependence of mental states on a mind. The second 
likens divine omniscience to the kind of knowledge which it has often been 
supposed we have of the contents of our own minds. After rebutting objec-
tions to these arguments, I conclude that both theists and non-idealists 
should be surprised and discomforted by my contentions. 
1. Introduction 
Berkeley famously maintained that physical objects are nothing but 
collections of ideas. From the Commentaries, we have the claim that 
We see the Horse it self, the Church it self it being an Idea and 
nothing more. The House it self the Church it self is an Idea ... 1 
while in the Principles, we find 
... collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like 
sensible things. 2 
Equally famously, Dr.Johnson sought to refute Berkeley's position by 
kicking a stone: 
Sir, I refute it thus. 3 
One does not have to be a follower of Johnson's blinkered commonsense 
to share his feeling that there is something obviously wrong with the 
Berkeleyan claim. One's first response is that the claim does not make 
sense, because it involves a category mistake. Just as (say) numbers 
could not turn out to be physical objects, so (one feels) it could not be the 
case that objects are collections of ideas. And if one gets beyond this 
feeling of there being a category mistake, the identification nevertheless 
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seems plainly mistaken (objects are publicly perceivable, distinct from 
perceivers, able to exist unperceived, etc., whereas none of these seems 
to be true of ideas or collections of them). Berkeley himself seems to 
have felt some embarrassment at the position he was defending, though 
he attributed this to the verbal formulation rather than to the substance 
of his thesis. In the Commentaries, he remarks 
truly I should perhaps have stuck to ye word thing, and not men-
tion'd the Word Idea. 4 
and in the Principles, we find the following objection with his reply to it: 
But, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, 
and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so, the word idea 
not being used in common discourse to signify the several combi-
nations of sensible qualities, which are called things ... But this doth 
not concern the truth of the proposition. 5 
I believe that Berkeley'S position can be seen in a much more sympa-
thetic light if viewed against a theological background. Berkeley'S best-
known route to his idealist conclusion went via his argument that to 
understand our claims about chairs, tables, etc., in terms of matter 
involved, us in contradictions. But his idealist conclusion can be reached 
by two other routes, which I shall call the dependency route and the 
knowledge route. These have an interest different from and independent 
of the interest which attaches to Berkeley'S own route. For Berkeley'S 
idealism, even if not strictly implied by the theistic assumptions which he 
shares with his critics, is at least a much more natural expression of those 
assumptions than Berkeley'S own arguments would suggest. To that 
extent Berkeley's position is more consistent than that of many of his crit-
ics-certainly more consistent than that of his theistic critics. 
2. The Dependency Argument 
Let us begin with the dependency route. We can conveniently take as 
our starting point the Cartesian concept of substance. Descartes takes 
over from earlier philosophers the concept of substance as that which 
can exist independently of other things. 
By substance [he tells us] we can understand nothing other than a 
thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other things 
for its existence. b 
This definition can be interpreted in different ways, each way yielding 
substantial status to different items. If we take the independence to be 
causal independence, for example, we will get one extension for the con-
cept of substance; and if we take it to be logical independence, we will 
get a different extension. 
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It is not entirely clear which of these two kinds of independence 
Descartes has in mind, perhaps in part because he does not have the 
modern distinction between causal and logical independence. But he 
appears to mean that in order to achieve substantial status, an item must 
display at least causal independence, i.e. it must not depend causally on 
the existence of anything else for its own existence. Given this rather 
demanding conception of substance, Descartes rightly draws the conclu-
sion that only God could be a substance: 
There is only one substance which can be understood to depend on 
no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other 
substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of 
God's concurrence. Hence the term 'substance' does not apply 
univocally, as they say in the Schools, to God and to other things ... 7 
Thus, when Descartes says that matter and minds are substances, they 
are substances in a different sense from that in which God is a substance. 
They are, as it were, second class substances, in that they depend on 
nothing other than God for their existence, in contrast to, e.g., attributes 
like thought and extension, which depend not just on God, but also on 
the existence of mental and material substances of which they are the 
attributes. So God is the only wholly independent being. In more famil-
iar theological terms, he is the uncaused causer. 
Now we need to focus a little more closely on what is implied by this 
conception of causation. Living in the shadow of Hume, we think natu-
rally of causation as a relation between events. On this conception, the 
cause is something that happens at a time, then ceases to happen and 
does not thereafter continue to exert its causal influence. Thus, if the 
window broke because it was struck by the stone, the impact of the 
stone occurs at one moment, and is followed by the breakage of the 
glass. And for the glass to stay broken, the stone does not have to keep 
exerting its destructive power: it needs to hit the glass only once. On 
this conception of causation, the causative role of God in relation to the 
rest of the universe would consist in his creating the universe at a time, 
after which his creative power would no longer be required. And this is 
how Pascal interpreted Descartes's view of God's causative role: 
I cannot forgive Descartes. He would gladly have left God out of his 
whole philosophy. But he could not help making him give one flip 
to set the world in motion. After that, he had no more use for God. 8 
But in fact this is a complete misunderstanding of the Cartesian con-
ception of divine causal power. Descartes takes the metaphysical view 
that all created things have a continuous tendency to undergo annihila-
tion. So if they are to remain in existence moment by moment, there has 
to be a constant opposing force to counter this annihilatory tendency. 
God not only has to create things in the first place: he also has to contin-
ue exercising this very same creative power, moment by moment, to 
keep things in existence. The moment he ceases to exercise his creative 
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power in respect of any created object, it ceases to exist. So, in 
Descartes's eyes, God not only gives the initial "flip" to which Pascal 
refers - he also supplies a continuous subsequent "flip" to keep things in 
existence. This comes out very clearly in a passage in the 3rd 
Meditation: 
... a lifespan can be divided into countless parts, each completely 
independent of the others, so that it does not follow from the fact 
that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless there is 
some cause which as it were creates me afresh at this moment -
that is, which preserves me. For ... the same power and action are 
needed to preserve anything at each individual moment of its 
duration as would be required to create that thing anew if it were 
not yet in existence. Hence the distinction between preservation 
and creation is only a conceptual one ... Y 
Precisely the same thought is echoed by Spinoza in his Ethics: 
... God is not only the cause of things coming into existence, but 
also of their continuing in existence.1O 
So the position we have reached is that God brings about the exis-
tence of the world of objects by the exercise of his creative power; and by 
the exercise of the same power, though under the different label of con-
servation, he keeps those objects in existence. There appears to be noth-
ing Berkeleyan or suspiciously idealist about such claims. Rather, they 
express one strand of mainstream Western theism. 
Now let us turn to the relationship between a human and the ideas 
in her own mind. In particular, let us focus on a situation in which she is 
consciously recalling events from the past. By the exercise of her will, 
she summons up thoughts of what she did the day before. Whether 
those thoughts come into her mind is up to her. If she chooses to sum-
mon them up, she can; if she chooses to keep them in the forefront of her 
mind, she can; and if she chooses to banish them, she can. Suppose we 
now add the plausible assumption that those thoughts do not exist 
antecedently to her thinking them, and do not continue to exist after she 
has stopped thinking them. Certainly the capacity to summon them up, 
and the capacity to dismiss them exist both before and after her con-
scious contemplation of the thoughts. But the thoughts themselves do 
not exist outside her consciousness of them; and whether she is con-
scious of them depends entirely on her will in the matter. 
We can now see that there is a very striking parallel between the 
human mind and such thoughts on the one hand, and God and the 
objects in the world on the other. The person's thoughts are in a sense 
created from nothing (in the sense that they did not exist antecedently to 
her consciousness of them, unlike, e.g., written records of the past, 
which she might have consulted). They continue to exist for as long as 
she chooses to be conscious of them, and they exist only because she so 
chooses. The moment she chooses to cease to be conscious of them, they 
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cease to exist. They do not merely cease to be present to her: they are 
annihilated. Her thoughts are thus dependent on her mind in very 
much the same way that traditional theism thinks that the objects in the 
world are dependent on God's mind. 
What I have here been illustrating in connection with memory will go 
for other mental states. Whenever our conscious thoughts are under our 
control, the parallel between our thinking and God's causal! conserving 
activity will be present. In addition to cases of memory, it would also be 
present in, e.g., cases of deliberation of an untaxing kind. I choose when 
to begin my deliberation, I keep it in existence by my free choice, and 
when I choose to stop deliberating, the deliberation ceases to exist. The 
mental states which will be excluded will be those which are not wholly 
under our control, either because we cannot summon them up in the first 
place (lapse of memory, inability to concentrate, etc.) or because we can-
not get rid of them (obsessive thoughts which keep crowding in on us). 
But it remains true that a large range of typical cases of human conscious 
thought will have the features which I noted in the case of memory. 
This, then, gives us the first alternative route (the dependency route) 
from traditional theism to idealism, going via the concepts of creation, 
causation, and will. In traditional theism, God is the creator and sus-
tainer of all things. It is only because he continuously exercises his cre-
ative power or will that the whole physical universe continues to exist 
moment by moment. 50 chairs and tables are related to his mind, and in 
particular to his volitional nature, in very much the same sort of way 
that at least some of our conscious states are related to our minds. From 
here, it is clearly but a small step to declare that chairs and tables just are 
a certain sort of idea in the divine mind. 
3. Could Berkeley have accepted the dependency argument? 
It is clear that Berkeley could comfortably have accepted the depen-
dency argument. As noted above, its central premise that everything is 
ultimately dependent on God is a tenet of orthodox theism, and one 
which there is no reason to think that Berkeley would have rejected. 
Further, the assumptions which the argument makes about the depen-
dence of conscious states on the person whose states they are would have 
been acceptable to him. He would of course have envisaged persons as 
being just minds or spirits, not persons in the 5trawsonian sense. But 
those assumptions about the nature of conscious states are neutral on the 
issue of how the term "person" is to be interpreted. 50 there are good 
reasons to believe that Berkeley would have accepted the premises of the 
dependency argument; and since the conclusion (i.e., idealism) is one of 
the things he was most concerned to establish, it is clear that the way is 
open to him to accept the dependency argument as I have stated it. 
But further, there is some reason to think that Berkeley would have 
found the argument even more compelling than I suggested when I pre-
sented it. For Berkeley strengthens the parallel between God's relation 
to objects, and our relation to our thoughts, in two further ways. First, 
he interprets causation in terms of willing. For some thinkers, to say 
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that God causes something would not be to say anything about God's 
will. Spinoza, for example, while attributing causal powers to God, 
denies that God has a will. But the position is quite different with 
Berkeley, for he asserts that it is only in terms of will that we can under-
stand causation at all: 
.. .1 have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I 
conceive volition to be any where but in a spirit: therefore when I 
speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a spirit. 11 
So the causal dependence of creation on God turns out to mean sim-
ply that God wills the created universe to exist; just as in the dependen-
cy argument, it is simply by our willing that some of our conscious 
states are brought into existence. 
That gives us, then, one way in which claims peculiar to Berkeley 
allow him to accept a strengthened version of the dependency argu-
ment. But there is also a second way in which the Berkeleyan version of 
the argument could be stronger. For Berkeley at least flirts with a sup-
plementary thesis which implies that a God-like dependency relation 
holds between a person and all of her conscious states. In the 
Commentaries, he writes: 
While I exist or have any Idea I am eternally, constantly willing, 
my acquiescing in the present State is willing. 12 
A natural reading of this is that in respect of all the ideas I have, it is 
entirely up to me whether they are present to my mind, continue to be 
present to my mind, or cease to be present to my mind. And if we inter-
pret Berkeley in this way the parallel between a person and her ideas on 
the one hand, and God and objects on the other, is even closer than I 
suggested above. For of course orthodox theism maintains that all 
objects in the universe, not just some subset of them, display the depen-
dency relation which Berkeley is here attributing to all of our ideas. 
This thesis that we are constantly willing is one that does not appear in 
his published writing, at least not if we construe it to mean that all our 
ideas are under our control. It is replaced by the incompatible view that at 
least some of the changes in our ideas occur without any input from our 
wills (from which he infers that the changes must be caused by some 
other spirit). So perhaps this strengthening of the dependency argument 
is not one which he could embrace consistently with his published writ-
ing. But he does not backtrack on the thought that in relation to that sub-
set of ideas over which we do have control, we exercise a God-like power. 
That this is not a forced reading of Berkeley's meaning is further con-
firmed by another passing remark which he makes, also in the 
Commentaries: 
Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things out 
of Nothing. certainly we our selves create in some wise whenever 
we imagine.13 
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This, too, is a thought which is not explicitly found in the published 
writings. But it nonetheless simply makes explicit what is implicit in 
both the Principles and the Dialogues. 
Given the parallels between the dependence of objects on God's 
causal power, and of some human thoughts on our volition; and given 
Berkeley's assimilation of causation and volition; and given that our 
volition is something that exists in our minds; it is clear that one very 
natural way in which Berkeley could have established his idealism is by 
invoking the dependency argument. 
4. The Knowledge Argument 
The dependency argument described in section 2 went from tradition-
al theism to idealism via the concepts of causation and dependence. But 
there is another route from the same starting point to the same destina-
tion, going by the concept of divine omniscience. 
That God is omniscient is a familiar and central tenet of traditional 
theism. Exactly how this concept of omniscience is to be understood is a 
matter of some debate, and I shall return to it later. But its precise defin-
ition is not a matter of importance in this context. For our present pur-
poses, a close enough approximation will be that the thesis of God's 
omniscience is the acceptance of the claim: 
(A) For all values of p: if p, then God knows that p 
The converse of this, namely 
(B) For all values of p: if God knows that p, then p 
is of course trivially true, and is a simple consequence of the fact that 
knowledge requires truth. If we put (A) and (B) together, we get 
(C) P if and only if God knows that p 
and this in turn implies the weaker claim 
(D) p if and only if God believes that p 
This implies 
(E) For all values of p having the form "x exists": p if and only if 
God believes that p 
Now let us turn to the question of the relation between a person and 
the contents of her mind. Consider a claim very close to (E), namely 
(F) For all values of p having the form "x exists" (where x ranges 
over conscious states): p if and only if the owner of the mental state 
believes that p 
